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Abstract 
The European Union (EU) is seen as the leading actor in successfully fighting piracy 
around the Horn of Africa. As a global trade power with strong economic interests, 
the EU is also challenged by similar maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea. To 
date, there has been no comprehensive analysis to assess the potential transfer of 
successful EU instruments from the Horn of Africa to the piracy situation in West 
African waters. This paper examines to what extent the EU can draw on its 
experience made in the Horn of Africa to deter piracy in West African waters. Based 
on qualitative research interviews, lessons learned from East Africa are identified and 
subsequently applied to the situation in the Gulf of Guinea. The results show that the 
EU is only partially drawing on its experience made in the Horn of Africa. One the one 
hand, it is rather reluctant to use crisis management instruments such as naval 
operations. On the other hand, the EU is drawing on its successful leadership in 
international political and military cooperation from around the Horn of Africa in 
order to make more effective use of available resources in the Gulf of Guinea. 
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Introduction 
“The world’s seas and oceans are oceans of opportunities. [...] 
They are indispensable for the future of mankind. [...] Piracy and 
maritime crime are part of the dark downside of globalisation.”1 
The global maritime domain is characterised by a paradox. On the one hand, 
oceans and seas cover 71 percent of the Earth’s surface. A huge part of it is defined 
as the ‘high sea’ or ‘international waters’, an area that is largely under-governed 
and cannot be patrolled in its entirety. On the other hand, shipping is the backbone 
of international trade and of European prosperity. About 90 percent of the global 
trade in goods is transported by sea. Pirates try to take advantage of this dilemma.  
Our image of piracy has been romanticised by the entertainment industry 
and Hollywood productions, for instance in the film series ‘Pirates of the Caribbean’ 
with Johnny Depp as the Captain of Pirates. In the last years, this nostalgia has 
gained a modern relevance and a rather worrying topicality with the rise of piracy 
attacks in the Indian Ocean. In its turn, this contemporary phenomenon has furnished 
the plot for another Hollywood production, based not on fantasy but on reality: the 
2013 thriller ‘Captain Phillips’ was inspired by the hijacking of the cargo ship Maersk 
Alabama in 2009 off the Somali coast.  
In 2008, the number of attacks in the Horn of Africa reached a level that 
triggered a reaction by the international community. The European Union (EU) 
subsequently deployed its first European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) to the 
Somali coast and the EU has since become an important player in the field of 
maritime security. In the process, the EU committed itself to enhancing global 
maritime security by adopting the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) in June 
2014. 2  Further to its naval presence, the EU has successfully deployed various 
counter-piracy resources in the Horn of Africa, leading to a significant decline in 
attacks against merchant and fishing vessels and ships of the World Food 
Programme (WFP). The EU is seen as the leading actor in the region and considers its 
1 M. Houben, Head of EU Support Team for the EU Presidency of the Chairmanship Contact 
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, European External Action Service, conference, 
“Safe Seas: turning shared maritime interests into global security responsibilities”, Brussels, 
European Economic and Social Committee, 24 March 2015. 
2  Council of the European Union, European Union Maritime Security Strategy, 11205/14, 
Brussels, 24 June 2014. 
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various instruments and policies as a successful example of a Comprehensive 
Approach towards this crisis.3  
On the other side of the African continent, the EU faces maritime security risks 
as well. According to statistics from the International Maritime Bureau, West African 
waters 4  have become the second most affected region by piracy and armed 
robbery at sea, after the South China Sea. Of the reported incidents in 2014, 
comprised of actual and attempted attacks, 41 took place off West and Central 
African countries, whereas the number of reported Somali pirates’ attacks 
decreased from 219 in 2010 to only 11 in 2014.5 Hence, it is reasonable to hypothesise 
that the EU might draw on its successes in the Horn of Africa and apply the same 
toolkit in West Africa. Therefore, the guiding question of this paper is: How far could 
the EU draw on its experiences made in the Horn of Africa to deter piracy in West 
African waters? 
This research question will be answered using two case studies, focussing on 
the interests and the room of manoeuvre for the EU to fight piracy and armed 
robbery at sea. The EU’s response to maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Aden, widely 
seen as a success, will be compared with the Gulf of Guinea. Data for this paper 
were collected by conducting seven expert interviews with the relevant EU 
institutions and private stakeholders.6 Furthermore, information and evaluations were 
gathered during two conferences and one hearing.7  
The paper argues that the EU is addressing maritime security in West African 
waters with a less comprehensive approach than it did around the Horn of Africa. 
One lesson learned is that the EU is more inclined to prevent maritime threats from 
rising. Further, drawing on its experiences in in East Africa, the EU’s objectives in the 
Gulf of Guinea are to strengthen regional cooperation and to provide training and 
technical expertise. However, it is rather reluctant to deploy naval assets in the 
framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Building on the 
3 Interview with an official, Division for the Horn of Africa, East Africa and Indian Ocean, 
European External Action Service, Brussels, 20 March 2015; hereinafter referred to as ‘Interview 
EEAS East Africa’. 
4 For the purpose of this paper, the term ‘West African waters’ designates the coasts of the 
following Western and Central African countries: Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, The Congo, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola. 
5 ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Report for the 
Period 1 January – 31 December 2014, London, 2015, p. 5. 
6 See bibliography for a full list of conducted face-to-face interviews. 
7 European Parliament, Meeting of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, 16-17 March 
2015, Brussels; European Economic and Social Committee, Safe Seas: can an Integrated 
Maritime Surveillance be achieved by the EU?, 24 March 2015, Brussels; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 
EU Office, EU-African Perspectives on Maritime Security, 4 June 2015, Brussels. 
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successes off the Somali coast, the EU is ready to help establish or strengthen existing 
international political and military cooperation fora for the Gulf of Guinea. 
In order to allow a systematic approach to the outlined research topic, the 
first section defines the basic legal provisions related to piracy and armed robbery as 
examples of violence committed by non-state actors. Attention will be given to the 
securitisation of maritime risks in the last decade, in particular by the EU itself. The 
motivations for the EU to fight against piracy will also be highlighted. The second 
section presents the maritime security threats in the Horn of Africa, which became a 
serious problem from 2008 onwards. There will be a particular focus on the situation 
ashore in Somalia, and factors that enabled the rise of pirate attacks in the Western 
Indian Ocean will be identified. The objective of this section is to identify which 
instruments of the EU – and of the other public and private actors – have been 
decisive in deterring piracy off the Somali coast. In the third section, the situation of 
important coastal countries and the respective incidence of maritime crime will be 
analysed. Recent figures will demonstrate that the nature and locus of pirate attacks 
differ strongly between the two Gulfs. Therefore, the EU – in a hypothetical 
perspective – cannot simply replicate all the instruments from the East African in West 
African waters. However, apart from tailor-made instruments, some resources that 
were successful around the Horn of Africa could also be deployed in the West 
African context; and their respective fit or misfit will be studied to create a vision of 
how the EU might potentially react. 
 
Piracy and armed robbery at sea as new security risks for the EU? 
Maritime threats and non-state actors 
From the end of the seventeenth century, piracy was commonly understood as 
“unlawful depredation at sea involving the use or threat of violence possibly, but not 
necessarily, involving robbery”. 8  When taking a closer look at the criminals, it 
becomes evident that they are non-state actors posing a particular security threat. 
Pirates can be characterised as status quo-oriented, depending on legitimate trade 
and governance to secure their achievements and to sustain the enabling factors of 
their criminal activity. Their territorial claims are rather limited. Violence is used as a 
8 M.N. Murphy, Small boats, weak states, dirty money: Piracy and maritime terrorism in the 
modern world, New York, Columbia University Press, 2010, p. 7. 
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means of intimidation but is not a primary goal in itself; the pirates pursue primarily 
economic goals and are not following a socio-political agenda.9  
These elements, however, only reflect the outsider’s perspective. Piracy can 
also be seen as an intrinsic part of a society’s fiscal and commercial life, and local 
communities may even give shelter and support the criminal gangs. In their own 
narrative, pirates see themselves in some cases as a parallel customs authority 
collecting ‘taxes’ from ships crossing their respective territorial waters if central state 
governance structures are missing. 10  In the Somali case, pirates initially saw 
themselves as the coastguards of a failed central state that was powerless to protect 
coastal communities from illegal exploitation of Somali fish resources by huge foreign 
ships and from toxic waste dumping – two factors that deprived local fishers of their 
source of income.11 The provision of coastguard functions and the economic growth 
related to piracy in the coastal communities can actually endow criminal gangs with 
legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. 
Piracy is, furthermore, related to different dimensions of security. For seafarers 
who are victims of piracy attacks, the fundamental and rather traditional meaning of 
‘security’ that entails not being killed or hurt is at stake. Further to this individual and 
human level of security, piracy can also affect the societal level of security. When 
important sea lines of communication (SLOC) are interrupted because of piracy, 
maritime insecurity can lead to economic insecurity at the societal level.  
Legal framework of the maritime domain 
Almost three quarters of our globe are covered by oceans and seas. This huge 
surface cannot of course be regularly patrolled without immense costs. Furthermore, 
a liberal approach of maritime governance in international customary law, mare 
liberum, promotes the freedom of navigation as a pillar for free international trade. 
The vast majority of marine spaces are thereby seen as not belonging to any state, 
but as constituting shared territory where, in principle, no jurisdiction prevails. As a 
threat to the freedom of navigation, piracy has consequently been seen as a 
universal challenge and a global problem, making pirates inherent enemies to the 
idea of free high seas.12 
9 A. Bailes, U. Schneckener & H. Wulf, "Revisiting the State Monopoly on the Legitimate Use of 
Force", DCAF Policy Paper, no. 24, Geneva, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces, 2007, pp. 12-14. 
10 Murphy, op. cit., p. 130. 
11 D. Helly, Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, lecture, Bruges, 23 March 2015. 
12 Murphy, op. cit., pp. 11f. 
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The first international agreement that dealt with piracy was the Convention on 
the High Seas of 1958 which established the four pillars of piracy: (1) the private 
character of piracy attacks committed by non-state actors; (2) the high seas as the 
place where attacks occur; (3) the right for states to seize pirates, using the 
authorised government services of a state; and (4) the right of this state to apply its 
jurisdiction to any pirates arrested.13 These principles were then also included in the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) of 1982 that became 
the standard document of reference for international maritime law. Hence, piracy in 
terms of international law is restricted to the high seas. However, acts of violence, 
detention or depredation against private ships for private ends also occur in territorial 
waters, that is, in the 12 nautical miles zone of a coastal country. The definition of 
“armed robbery at sea” by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) filled this 
gap in international maritime law only as late as 2009.14 Thus, it can be concluded 
that the main difference between piracy and armed robbery at sea is the locus 
delicti.15 
The authority to conduct counter-piracy activities follows, again, a 
geographical logic. All states that are parties to the UNCLOS are obliged to 
cooperate in the repression of piracy on the high seas.16 In the territorial waters under 
a coastal state’s jurisdiction, that state has the sole sovereign right to enforce its 
respective legal provisions regarding armed robbery at sea. However, derogations to 
this general rule are possible, as seen in the Somali case where piracy repression was 
conducted in territorial waters and even ashore with the agreement of the coastal 
country. 
Murphy argues that this division between piracy and armed robbery at sea 
along the line between territorial and international waters is not well adapted to 
what he calls a “singular problem: the exploitation of a fluid medium for diverse but 
violent, criminal acts”, which also has an international character because of the 
various nationalities of its perpetrators and victims.17 
  
13 United Nations, Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, 1958, articles 14-21. 
14  International Maritime Organisation, Resolution A.1025(26), Code of Practice for the 
Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, 2009, p. 4. 
15 R. Geiss & A. Petrig, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: The Legal Framework for Counter-
Piracy Operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 
74. 
16 United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 1982, art. 
100. 
17 Murphy, op. cit., p. 10. 
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The EU’s securitisation of the maritime domain 
In the 20th century, piracy was seen as a problem belonging to history without great 
relevance for the modern world.18 However, in the early 2000s, piracy became a 
serious problem for seafarers with a high level of 400-500 reported incidents 
worldwide per year (see Figure 1).19 Nonetheless, it can be argued that piracy and 
armed robbery at sea were still largely ignored by international security actors at this 
time.20 It was only in 2008 and following the rise of piracy off the Somali coast that 
piracy firmly entered the agenda of the international security community. 
The securitisation framework originally proposed by Waever, Buzan and de 
Wilde tries to deconstruct how a political actor can move an issue from the normal 
political sphere into the security sphere.21 These scholars argue that the security 
agenda is not objective and externally determined but intersubjective and socially 
constructed through speech acts. The three elements of the securitisation framework 
are: the issue that is constructed as a threat; the referent (the collective that is said to 
be exposed to this threat); and the practice (the urgent and extraordinary measures 
by the state or political elites to respond to the issue).22 
Figure 1: Piracy and armed robbery incidents since 1984 
 
Source: International Maritime Organisation, Annual Report – 2013, op. cit., annex 4. 
18 Ibid., p. 13. 
19 International Maritime Organisation, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships, Annual Report – 2013, 1 March 2013, annex 4. 
20 Ch. Bueger & J. Stockbruegger, “Security Communities, Alliances, and Macrosecuritization: 
The Practices of Counter-Piracy Governance”, in M. Struett, J. Carlson & M. Nance (eds.), 
Maritime Piracy and the Construction of Global Governance, New York, Routledge, 2013, p. 
99. 
21 B. Buzan, O. Wæver & J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, Lynne 
Rienner, 1998, pp. 21-26. 
22 Ibid. 
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Since the UN Secretary General published a Report on Oceans and Law of the Sea in 
2008, piracy has commonly been seen as one of the key threats to maritime security. 
The notion of maritime security itself can be described as an international buzzword: 
“a term that draws attention to new challenges and rallies support for tackling 
these”.23 The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) did not contain a substantial 
reference to piracy as a threat; maritime security was not on the European agenda 
at that earlier stage. However, with the rise of piracy attacks in the Horn of Africa and 
the deployment of the first naval military operation under the framework of the 
CSDP, a strategic framework for the EU’s action on the seas and oceans was felt to 
be missing. The EUMSS of 2014 filled this gap by linking the rather economic EU 
Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) with the ESS. The result is a broad notion of security 
that encompasses dimensions of traditional, societal, economic, environmental and 
human security. 
Hence, tasked by the highest level of political actors in the EU - the European 
Council - the EU has securitised the maritime domain and put piracy on the political 
agenda again. The nature of threats to maritime security, and the referent (in terms 
of securitisation theory), have thus been identified: but it is still to be seen to what 
extent the EUMSS can or will be implemented within the multi-level und multi-sectoral 
framework of the EU.  
Which have been the motivations of the EU as an actor for securitising 
piracy? First of all, direct security concerns are related to the human costs of piracy. 
The crew face the threat or use of violence, and they may be taken hostage, 
tortured or killed in order to increase the pressure to make the ship-owners pay 
ransoms. Hence, there is a demand for security provision from the seafarers and their 
trade unions.24 Related to this are the interests of European ship-owners who bear a 
part of the financial costs related to piracy and armed robbery at sea. In a market 
with low prices and strong competition for maritime transport, they demanded an 
anti-piracy response by the EU in order to secure their businesses, arguing that the 
same level of awareness and action for aviation and maritime security should 
apply. 25 The business interests of European ship-owners have played an important 
role in forging the EU’s response to piracy as a maritime threat. Moreover, the EU, as 
a major global trade bloc, relies heavily on the freedom of navigation of vessels 
carrying goods that it either exports or imports in order to satisfy its own needs. 
23 Ch. Bueger, “What is maritime security?”, Marine Policy, vol. 53, 2015, p. 159. 
24 A. Graveson, Senior National Secretary, Nautilus International, conference, “Safe Seas”, op. 
cit. 
25  Interview with a representative of the European Community Shipowners’ Association, 
Brussels, 18 March 2015; hereinafter referred to as ‘Interview ECSA’. 
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Interestingly, the EUMSS also sees energy security as an important dimension of 
maritime security for an EU that is increasingly dependent on energy imports. 26 
Hence, the EU’s interests related to the global maritime domain are manifold and 
relate to different dimensions of security.  
The EU’s response to piracy in the Horn of Africa: a comprehensive approach? 
Somalia – a failed state, piracy and the EU’s responses 
Piracy and all types of maritime crime have their root causes ashore, including both 
endogenous and exogenous elements. The pirates operating off the Horn of Africa 
are based in Somalia, but their activities extend also to the territorial waters of 
neighbouring countries that have few capabilities to tackle this problem. Somalia is, 
however, the core of this threat to maritime security due to its fragile state structure.  
The absence of effective control of the Somali coastline through state 
authorities triggered irresponsible exploitation of Somalia’s rich marine resources by 
foreign fishing vessels from Europe and East Asia.27 This led to existential problems for 
the coastal communities that were relying on fishing to sustain their local economies. 
Fishermen became angry coastguards for whom piracy became a profitable 
business.28 The degradation of local environmental security led to poor economic 
security. Piracy emerged as a serious security threat for fishing and merchant vessels. 
The extreme poverty in affected areas and the promise of receiving significant 
financial rewards by cashing in on ransoms or the cargo of the vessels are also 
crucial conditions for piracy to thrive.29 
Somali pirates have been operating under the protection of warlords’ 
forces.30 Further, there have been repeated allegations about the involvement of 
the Puntland authorities, who also held senior positions within the transitional federal 
government.31 The problem of Somali piracy is thus rooted in the failure of the state 
to suppress piracy and in the fact that the society is divided and some of the factions 
support the pirates’ activities, due also to the absence of economic alternatives in 
the coastal communities.32 
26 Council of the European Union, op. cit., p. 2. 
27 Murphy, op. cit., p. 101. 
28 J. Bahadur, The Pirates of Somalia. Inside their hidden world, New York, Vintage House, 
2011, 2nd edn., p. 16. 
29 J. Burnett, Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas, 2002, New York, 
Plume, 2002, p. 117. 
30 Murphy, op. cit., p. 105. 
31 Ibid., p. 108. 
32 Ch. Kaunert & K. Zwolski, The EU as a global security actor: A comprehensive analysis 
beyond CFSP and JHA, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 169. 
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How did the EU’s foreign policy tackle this maritime threat off the Somali 
coast? In general, in the multiple policy areas belonging to its external relations, the 
EU has different levels of competences, structures and instruments. In order to 
achieve consistent external action, not only by the member states and the EU, but 
also in horizontal terms between the different EU sectoral services responsible for 
areas such as development cooperation or external trade, the EU has developed a 
Comprehensive Approach to crises and conflicts.33 In the particular case of piracy in 
Somalia, the Commission and the EEAS consider themselves to be realising the 
Comprehensive Approach successfully.34 However, the European Parliament in its 
report on the Comprehensive Approach criticised that “EU action in the region has 
been built up on the basis of pioneering CSDP initiatives” and that the 
Comprehensive Approach is therefore “more of an ex-post empirical and pragmatic 
achievement rather than a well designed and planned strategy”.35 The EU started 
the strategic discussion only after engaging militarily in the region, and the 
institutional actors recognise that the EU acted too late in the Horn of Africa.36 The 
‘common strategic vision’ followed only in November 2011 when the Foreign Affairs 
Council adopted a regional strategy for the Horn of Africa. However, the EEAS’s 
position is that, even if the non-military action came late, at least the EU’s current 
engagement in Somalia and the region is comprehensive.37  
Deterring Somali piracy – short-term responses by the EU 
From 2006 onwards, attacks by pirates off the Somali coast surged to such a degree 
that the UNSC, in 2008, encouraged member states to take action to deter pirate 
activities in cooperation with Somalia’s transitional federal government. It even 
authorised foreign naval forces to enter the Somali territorial waters in pursuit of 
pirates.38  
Following this UNSC Resolution, European ship-owners, especially the Danish, 
pushed for a military response by the EU to protect ships, their crew and cargo.39 In 
November 2008, the Foreign Affairs Council launched the first common EU naval 
33 European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, Joint Communication: The EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflict 
and crises, JOIN(2013) 30 final, Brussels, 11 December 2013. 
34 Interview EEAS East Africa, op.cit. 
35 European Parliament, Report on the EU Comprehensive Approach and its implications for 
the coherence of EU external action, A7-0138/2014, Strasbourg, 21 February 2014. 
36 Interview with an official, Division for West Africa, European External Action Service, Brussels, 
18 March 2015; hereinafter referred to as ‘Interview EEAS West Africa’. 
37 Interview EEAS East Africa, op.cit. 
38 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1816 (2008), New York, United Nations, 2 June 
2008, arts. 3 and 7. 
39 Interview ECSA, op. cit. 
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operation, called ‘EUNAVFOR Atalanta’, with the mandate to protect vessels of the 
WFP and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) shipping, to deter and 
repress acts of piracy, and to protect, on a case-by-case basis, vulnerable shipping 
and to monitor fishing activities. EUNAVFOR Atalanta comprises 1200 personnel, four 
to seven warships and two to four aircraft.40 
However, military visibility is only one dimension of the Atalanta operation. A 
strongly appreciated tool of the EU’s security provision is an online-based exchange 
and reporting platform, the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA).41 
Through this mechanism, the mission’s headquarters carry out an interaction and an 
information exchange with the shipping companies: First, the companies register 
their ships with the platform and indicate their cargo and course; second, the 
OHQ/FHQ of EUNAVFOR plans its operations accordingly and provides risk 
assessments. 42  Further, EUNAVFOR has organised convoys of merchant vessels 
crossing the Gulf of Aden accompanied by warships and helicopters, and passing 
through an Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC, see Figure 2).43 
Figure 2: Group transit through the IRTC 
 
Source: NATO Shipping Centre, “Group transits through the IRTC”. 
It was estimated that in order to always have one ship ready within one hour to 
counter a potential attack, 83 warships would be necessary.44 This number, however, 
was never reached, despite other states and international organisations (US - CTF-
40  European External Action Service, European Union Naval Force Somalia Operation 
Atalanta, Brussels, 2014. 
41 Kaunert & Swolski, op. cit., p. 169. 
42 Interview with an official (no. 1), Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, European 
External Action Service, Brussels, 20 March 2015; hereinafter referred to as ‘Interview EEAS 
CMPD 1’. 
43 Helly, op. cit. 
44 D. Helly, “Lessons from Atalanta and EU counter-piracy policies”, Paris, European Union 
Institute for Security Studies, 2011, p. 11. 
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151, NATO Operation Ocean Shield, China, Russia, India) having deployed naval 
assets as well. Yet the various international naval forces did establish a de-confliction 
mechanism that enables cooperation on the operational level. This platform, the 
Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Meeting (SHADE), was open to all interested 
states. It became firmly established and its work was welcomed by the participants. 
Regardless of possible differences on the political level, on the operational level the 
EU, the US, Russia, China and others sat around the SHADE table and shared 
information on risks and planned manoeuvres. 45  The EU sees SHADE as “a 
remarkable, if not unique, operational success”.46 
Because of EUNAVFOR and all the connected activities and instruments, the 
EU has been seen as the leading military actor in international military efforts to 
counter piracy off the Somali coast. 47  However, the joint international efforts in 
maritime patrolling might only provide a limited deterrent given the vast maritime 
area to be covered.48 The EU is also keenly aware of the connection between 
maritime crime and its root causes ashore.49  
The ultimate goal of the EU is to sustain the current low level of incidents in 
East African waters around the Horn, with a view to reducing or withdrawing its costly 
naval force whose mandate currently runs until December 2016. The latest extension 
of EUNAVFOR’s mandate was commended by European ship-owners.50 The debate 
surrounding this decision is to a large extent also driven by the question of who pays 
for security. Whereas the maritime industry would itself bear the costs for self-
protection measures, such as the use of private security companies, the EUNAVFOR 
operation is paid for by the national budgets of the EU member states. In any case, 
EU member states – while commending the successes of this operation – are looking 
for a reduction of the naval presence after 2016, in view, inter alia, of other emerging 
threats like the Islamic State.51  
  
45 A. Clark, “Counter Piracy Operations, Challenges, Shortfalls and Lessons”, presentation, 4 
June 2009. 
46 M. Houben, “Operational coordination of naval operations and capacity building”, in T. 
Tardy (ed.), Fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia: Lessons learned from the Contact Group, 
Report, no. 20, Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2014, p. 29. 
47 A. Cole, Head of Global Maritime Crime Programme, United Nations Office for Drugs and 
Crime, presentation, Brussels, European Parliament, Subcommittee on Security and Defence, 
17 March 2015. 
48 Murphy, op. cit., p. 106. 
49 Interview EEAS East Africa, op. cit. 
50 Interview ECSA, op. cit. 
51 Interview EEAS East Africa, op. cit. 
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Tackling root causes – long-term engagements 
Beyond the deployment of EUNAVFOR in 2008, the EU has increased its efforts in the 
Horn of Africa, especially in Somalia, and uses instruments that are oriented to the 
medium and longer term. The EU’s approach in tackling the root causes is two-fold: 
firstly, establishing the rule of law and reforming the security sector, and secondly, 
improving the socio-economic situation.52 
The security-focussed approach is aimed at providing basic security and 
safety in Somalia and establishing the rule of law. The biggest risks for peace and 
stability in Somalia are linked to the civil war between clans and warlords, and to the 
terrorist insurgents of Al-Shabaab. With the objective of improving the security 
situation in Somalia and reforming the country’s security sector, the EU has deployed 
several instruments, which involve either its own direct actions or financial support for 
international partners’ efforts. 
Two instruments of the EU’s CSDP on land complement the naval operation 
at sea: the EU Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia) and the EU Regional Capacity 
Building Mission in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor). The military training provided, in 
close cooperation with other international actors like the US and the African Union 
(AU), aims at training the Somali armed forces in order to make them more efficient 
in fighting Al-Shabaab and the warlords who seek to undermine the federal 
government’s authority. In order to avoid further spill-over of the conflict into 
neighbouring countries, the AU has deployed a military operation in Somalia 
(AMISOM) with currently more than 20,000 soldiers. With the African Peace Facility 
(APF), the EU has a financial instrument for substantial contributions to the funding of 
African-led actions on peace and security. These efforts by the EU are important 
building blocks for the establishment of the Somali state’s monopoly of force, the rule 
of law, and an efficient and accountable security sector. 
With the objective of improving maritime security, and in particular of fighting 
piracy, the EU launched the civilian mission EUCAP Nestor in July 2012 with a zone of 
activity in Somalia, Djibouti, the Seychelles and Tanzania. Its objectives are to 
“enhance the capacity of the States […] to exert effective maritime governance” 
and to “strengthen regional cooperation and coordination of maritime security”.53 
This ongoing mission has 100 international and local staff – experts who advise, 
mentor and train port police, coastguards, navies, prosecutors and judges in three 
52 Ibid. 
53 European External Action Service, Regional Maritime Security Capacity Building Mission in 
the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (EUCAP Nestor), Brussels, 2014. 
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fields of competence: legal, maritime, and police.54 The mission has been criticised 
because of the mismatch between its complex, region-wide mandate and the low 
level of human resources.55 The mission is currently about to be re-focused towards a 
greater engagement in Somalia.56 
In close coordination with the CSDP instruments, the EU has also been 
providing support for enhancing maritime security through external financial 
instruments: the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), 57  and the 
European Development Fund (EDF). 58  The trans-regional Critical Maritime Routes 
(CMR) programme and the Maritime Security Programme (MASE) are designed to 
foster trans-regional cooperation, build capacities for the sharing of information and 
best practices, and to promote international standards and codes of conduct.59 The 
CMR programme is a follow-up to the adoption of the Djibouti Code of Conduct in 
2009 – a regional strategy that defines cooperation objectives for coastal countries 
regarding the prosecution of suspect pirates, the interdiction and seizure of pirate 
ships, rescue of attacked ships and the conduct of operations. 60 The EU is also 
cooperating with INTERPOL in implementing some aspects of the CMR programme. 
MASE is a joint undertaking of the EU and the UN Office for Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) to support the implementation of the Indian Ocean Regional Strategy and 
Action Plan (ESA-IO) adopted in 2010.61 
The EU is strengthening economic development in the Somali coastal 
communities by creating legal alternatives to criminal activities. These activities are 
channelled through the EDF, a development instrument designed for the EU’s 
associated group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.62 Within the 
current envelope (2014-2020), the 11th EDF foresees €286 million to be allocated to 
three focal sectors: strengthening the rule of law, improving basic safety and 
security, and creating sustainable employment opportunities.63  
54 Ibid. 
55 Deutsche Bundeswehr, Interview: EUCAP Nestor ist auf dem richtigen Weg, 13 June 2014. 
56 Interview EEAS East Africa, op. cit. 
57 Funding amounts to €16.5 million for the period of 2014-2017. 
58 Under the 11th EDF (2014-2020), the MASE project’s budget will be about €37.5 million. 
59 European Commission, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) - Thematic 
Strategy Paper 2014-2020, Brussels, 12 August 2014, p. 29. 
60 IMO, Djibouti Code of Conduct, 2015. 
61 Critical Maritime Routes Information Portal, MASE, 2015. 
62 Interview EEAS East Africa, op. cit. 
63  Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia & European Commission, National 
Indicative Programme for Federal Republic of Somalia 2014 to 2020, Nairobi, 19 June 2014, p. 
15. 
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The results of the EU’s and member states’ engagement, as the world’s 
biggest collective donor of official development assistance to Somalia, may 
however only be fully visible in ten or fifteen years time. 64 Even so, some initial 
successes have been achieved. Coastal communities are no longer supporting or 
protecting the pirates, as was the case when piracy and the resulting ransoms led to 
economic growth in these areas. The local population has become aware of the 
unlawful character of piracy.65 
Successes, problems and lessons learned at the Horn of Africa 
What has been the impact of the aforementioned long and short-term instruments? 
Currently, piracy off the Somali coast is no longer a maritime security problem. In 
2014, only eleven attempted attacks attributed to Somali pirates were reported, and 
none of them were successful, that is, no ships were boarded or hijacked.66 In this 
respect, EUNAVFOR was a success, providing the EU with international recognition 
through leading the international military efforts to deter piracy using joint 
operational planning.67 
Even if the EU’s naval force in the Western Indian Ocean may have 
monopolised the attention of the media, the EU must be seen as a comprehensive 
security actor in countering piracy off Somalia. Apart from the coordination with 
international partners, the EU also uses its numerous instruments in an effective and 
coherent way. It fills gaps that are caused by the fragility of Somalia and tries, at the 
same time, to re-build the local security sector, the rule of law and economic 
development. The EU is trying to make a coherent use of its different political, 
diplomatic, military, civilian and financial instruments. Coordination meetings 
between the Commission, the EEAS, and the Special Representative’s (EUSR) office, 
which are in charge of these instruments, take place on a weekly basis. 68  The 
Comprehensive Approach itself can be seen as embodying a lesson learned from 
the EU’s growing efforts in the Horn of Africa, even if the strategic debate about 
defining the EU’s priorities and areas of action began too late. More generally, a 
lesson learned from the EU’s engagement with the region is that it was too late to 
act. The prevention of piracy was not an EU priority when Somalia was breaking 
apart in the 2000s. 
64 Interview EEAS East Africa, op. cit. 
65 Ibid. 
66 ICC International Maritime Bureau, op.cit., p. 8. 
67 Cole, presentation, European Parliament, op. cit. 
68 Interview EEAS East Africa, op. cit. 
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The case of Somali piracy also demonstrates how the EU needs to take into 
account the actions of other international actors. It did so in supporting the AU and 
its AMISOM mission and in coordinating its political and military responses within the 
UN Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGCPS) and SHADE 
mechanisms. Further, it has supported other organisations in their efforts. The UNODC 
and INTERPOL both describe their cooperation with and support by the EU as very 
productive and fruitful.69 However, when working with partner organisations, the EU is 
heavily dependent on the latters’ efforts. For instance, the EU’s support package to 
AMISOM is sizeable but the EU has very little leverage on the mission’s operational 
command and its architecture.70 
The EU’s leadership is also illustrated by its pivotal role within the CGCPS, which 
the EEAS sees as “a new international governance model” – working with the UN but 
not being part of it.71 The EU’s status has risen from an observer in 2009, at the outset 
of this forum, to exercising the chairmanship from January 2014.72 The CGCPS serves 
to create international unanimity as a platform for finding responses to this 
international problem: “No other security challenge creates such an international 
unanimity.”73 Based on shared interests and mutual trust, the forum delivers concrete 
results, for instance in terms of the investigation and prosecution of suspected pirates, 
whilst respecting human rights.74 The CGCPS includes governmental actors and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as the private industry and civil society. It 
has become an “expansive, elastic, multi-faceted mechanism that, by 2014, had 
stimulated effective and coordinated action by stakeholders from virtually every 
sector of global society affected by the problem of piracy”.75 
In sum, the EU’s contribution to deterring piracy attacks in the Horn of Africa is 
certainly substantial. However, other factors – rather out of the EU’s control – have 
contributed to the prevention of incidents as well. European ship-owners stress two 
additional factors: firstly, the self-protection measures taken on vessels, the Best 
Management Practices (BMP), and secondly, the use of private security forces on 
69 Cole, presentation, European Parliament, op. cit. 
70 J. Daemers, “The EU in Somalia – beyond Atalanta”, Alert, no. 3, Paris, European Union 
Institute for Security Studies, 17 January 2014, p. 2. 
71 M. Houben, Head of the Support Team of the Contact Group on Piracy, European External 
Action Service, presentation, Brussels, European Parliament, Subcommittee on Security and 
Defence, 17 March 2015. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 H. Swarttouw & D. Hopkins, “The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: genesis, 
rationale and objectives”, in T. Tardy (ed.), Fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia: Lessons 
learned from the Contact Group, Report, no. 20, Paris, European Union Institute for Security 
Studies, 2014, p. 11. 
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board.76 More than half of the ships sailing through the Horn of Africa have private 
armed or unarmed guards on board.77 Their presence can deter an attack or even 
defend cargo and crew in case a ship is boarded by pirates. However, several legal 
issues are still a problem, and legislation in the various EU member states is either non-
existent or very diverse regarding the legality and liability of armed guards. 
Again, it is difficult to establish causalities between these three factors and 
the actual drop in piracy incidents off the Somali coast. In view of the international 
actors engaged in development cooperation, it is also difficult to say how effective 
the EU’s involvement has been. In terms of donors’ successes in building a safe and 
secure environment, and fostering economic development in Somalia, much will 
depend on the country itself. Somalia is still a thoroughly failed state, destabilised by 
civil war and the continued fighting between forces supporting the central 
government and Islamist insurgents. Hence, “it remains almost impossible to assess 
any progress”.78 
A shift of threats and responses from East to West Africa? 
Coastal countries – part of the solution or part of the problem?  
Whereas incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea spectacularly declined in the 
Gulf of Aden, piracy is often described as being on the rise in the Gulf of Guinea. In 
2014, only 11 incidents around the Horn of Africa were reported to the International 
Maritime Bureau but 41 incidents occurred in West African waters. Attacks off the 
Nigerian coast account for the greatest share of these incidents: 8 actual and 10 
attempted attacks were reported. 79 However, many attacks also go unreported 
because ship-owners fear higher insurance premiums or new attacks in view of 
recurrent schedules.80  
Nonetheless, two caveats must be made. Firstly, piracy and armed robbery at 
sea in the Gulf of Guinea are not a new problem. IMO data shows that attacks 
started to rise in 1995, reaching a level of around 50 incidents per year since 2001 – a 
level that has been maintained until today.81 However, whereas previous incidents 
were related to petty theft, a less significant form of piracy, attacks in recent years 
have increasingly aimed at seizing cargo (ship to ship) or taking hostages, with a 
76 Interview ECSA, op. cit. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Kaunert & Zwolski, op. cit., p. 186. 
79 ICC International Maritime Bureau, op. cit., p. 8. 
80 Interview ECSA, op. cit. 
81 International Maritime Organisation, Annual Report – 2013, op.cit., annex 4. 
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higher level of violence, and the use of sophisticated arms such as rockets.82 Second, 
the location of the attacks is different from East Africa. In the past, the attacks have 
occurred more in territorial waters than in international waters, in particular in port 
areas or rivers of the Niger delta.83 In East Africa, vessels were attacked far off the 
Somali coast. Since 2008, however, more attacks have been reported in international 
waters off Nigeria than in the country’s territorial waters.84  
Piracy and armed robbery at sea in this region is a problem for the EU 
because countries of the Gulf of Guinea account for 13 percent of oil and 6 percent 
of gas imports to the EU.85 On average, 30 EU flagged or owned ships are located at 
any one time in the Gulf.86 Further, the attacks disrupt trade and maritime transport in 
the region as a whole and thereby pose a threat to the international community.87 
Hence, many policy-makers in the EU are starting to diagnose a shift of piracy – and 
piracy-related concerns – from East to West Africa.88 Indeed, the Somali pirates may 
have inspired others by demonstrating that kidnapping and cashing in on ransoms is 
a profitable business.89  
The root causes of maritime crime in West Africa are to some extent 
comparable to those in East Africa. Again, low levels of economic development and 
high unemployment rates, combined with the lucrative financial opportunities of oil 
theft and associated criminal activities, attract young people. 90  Although the 
situation is slightly better in Nigeria – as the core country of the piracy problem in 
West Africa – than in Somalia, the country is still seen as a fragile state.91 However, 
the main reason for thriving piracy is the lack of rule of law and law enforcement in 
the region; and in this sense, the situation is again comparable to East Africa. The 
countries in the region, even if they mount patrols and make arrests, often lack the 
82 J. Bridger, “Kidnapped Americans in Context: The Shifting Forms of Nigerian Piracy”, US 
Naval Institute News, 31 October 2013; H. De Gouveia E Melo, Executive Assistant to the Chief 
of the Portuguese Naval Staff, conference, “Safe Seas: turning shared maritime interests into 
global security responsibilities”, Brussels, European Economic and Social Committee, 24 March 
2015; C. Barrios, “Fighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Offshore and onshore”, Brief Issue, no. 
20, Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies,, 2013, p. 3. 
83 Murphy, op. cit., p. 122f. 
84 De Gouveia E Melo, conference, European Economic and Social Committee, op. cit. 
85 European Commission, New EU initiative to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, Brussels, 10 
January 2013. 
86 European External Action Service, Fact Sheet – EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea, Brussels, 
17 March 2014, p. 2. 
87 Barrios, op. cit., p. 1. 
88  A. Fotyga, Member of the European Parliament (ECR), speech, Brussels, European 
Parliament, Subcommittee on Security and Defence, 17 March 2015. 
89 Cole, presentation, European Parliament, op. cit. 
90 Barrios, op. cit., p. 2. 
91 United Nations Development Programme, About Nigeria, 2013. 
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capabilities to effectively govern their territorial waters. 92  Further, especially in 
Nigeria, federal and local authorities seem to be interwoven with highly structured 
criminal networks.93 Attacks in the waters off Nigeria are also related to an insurgent 
group called MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta) which was 
already taking crew members as hostages in the mid-2000s – a pattern that is 
emerging again today.94 This group, which is active in the impoverished Niger Delta, 
demands greater benefits from the oil production in their region including 
investments in local infrastructures.95 
The collusion of Nigerian state authorities with criminal networks related to 
piracy and armed robbery at sea poses a challenge for the international community. 
Ship-owners are reluctant to share information with the coastal countries due to a 
lack of trust.96 Nigeria does not even allow the use of private security forces on board 
of merchant vessels in its territorial waters. For EU diplomats, the fact that Nigeria has 
arrested private guards is “simply outrageous”; and in general, the country seems to 
be part of the problem rather than part of the solution, with some from within the 
political elites benefiting from the profits of selling stolen oil on the black market.97  
Another problem in the Gulf of Guinea is the regional scope of the maritime 
threat. Numerous coastal countries are legally responsible for protecting their 
territorial waters. However, legal frameworks and capabilities to fulfil coastguard 
functions vary widely between these countries, and inter-state as well as inter-
regional communication needs to be improved.98 Pirates take advantage of the 
fragmented responsibilities off-shore. The EU, however, tries to turn the regional 
character of the challenge into a success factor. 
The EU’s support to regional solutions: from Yaoundé 2013 to Lomé 2015 
Mirroring the Djibouti Code of Conduct of 2009 which was adopted in order to foster 
regional cooperation against piracy around the Horn of Africa, the concerned 
countries around the Gulf of Guinea and in wider western African waters launched 
the Yaoundé process with a regional summit in the capital of Cameroon in June 
2013. This initiative was supported by the UNSC which had adopted Resolution 2018 
92 Murphy, op. cit., p. 119. 
93 Barrios, op. cit., p. 3. 
94 Bridger, op. cit. 
95 C. Duffield, “Who are Nigeria’s Mend oil militants?”, BBC NEWS, Lagos, 4 October 2010. 
96 Interview ECSA, op. cit. 
97 Interview with an official (no. 2), Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, European 
External Action Service, Brussels, 24 March 2015; hereinafter referred to as ‘Interview EEAS 
CMPD 2’. 
98 Barrios, op. cit., p. 3. 
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on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea in October 2011 and Resolution 2039 in February 
2012, expressing its deep concern and commending the prospect of a regional 
solution to the problem.99 
The summit in Yaoundé brought together the coastal countries, the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community 
of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC). The 
parties adopted a code of conduct concerning the fight against piracy and armed 
robbery at sea, and established a maritime security architecture for the region (see 
Figure 3). Under the umbrella of the Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC) in 
Yaoundé, regional cooperation centres were to be established for Central Africa 
(CRESMAC) and West Africa (CRESMAO).100 The EU welcomed the more practical 
character of this document compared to its Djibouti counterpart, which was rather 
legalistic.101  
Figure 3: The Maritime Regional Architecture in the Gulf of Guinea 
 
Source: Vircoulon & Tournier, op. cit. 
Cameroon is a leading nation in establishing the regional framework, and two of the 
maritime cooperation zones are already operational.102 While some successes have 
99  United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2018 (2011), New York, United Nations, 31 
October 2011; UNSC, Resolution 2039 (2012), New York, United Nations, 29 February 2012. 
100 T. Vircoulon & V. Tournier, “Gulf of Guinea: A Regional Solution to Piracy?”, In Pursuit of 
Peace Blog, International Crisis Group, 4 September 2014. 
101 Interview EEAS West Africa, op. cit. 
102 Ibid. 
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been achieved in implementing the Yaoundé decisions, in particular the 
establishment of the CRESMAC at Pointe-Noire in Congo-Brazzaville, much work still 
needs to be done in order to implement the Yaoundé process. Several obstacles 
remain. First, regional action around the Gulf requires not only coastal countries’ 
coordination but also the effective coordination between the two regional 
organisations ECCAS and ECOWAS. Second, the financial burden of making this 
maritime security architecture work is not to be underestimated – and this is where 
international support comes into play. The resource problem also applies to the lack 
of intervention capabilities in local coastguards and navies. Third, political rivalries 
and border disputes persist between countries that are supposed to cooperate and 
to exchange information. Finally, there are varying levels of concern among the 
coastal countries due to either the absence of political will to fight maritime crime, or 
the low frequency of attacks in their territorial waters or on their offshore assets.103  
It remains questionable, on a general level, whether the existing instruments 
are capable of tackling the root causes of piracy such as corruption and the 
importance of the regional oil black market:  
Gulf of Guinea piracy is above all an organized crime problem. Ships will never be 
safe until authorities strengthen police capacity to investigate and prosecute 
criminal networks, as well as enforce a zero tolerance policy for corruption in 
security services.104 
In response to pressure from the member states with historical ties to the region, such 
as France, Portugal, Spain and the UK, the EU endorsed this regional approach in 
March 2014 by adopting its regional strategy on the Gulf of Guinea.105 This strategic 
document focuses on the EU’s support for local states’ national and regional 
maritime capacity building, to ensure maritime awareness, security and the rule of 
law along their coasts, and on intra and interregional cooperation with ECCAS and 
ECOWAS and their respective member states.106 The strategy was followed up by the 
adoption of the Gulf of Guinea Action Plan by the Foreign Affairs Council in March 
2015: a detailed document of almost 40 pages, which maps existing EU and EU 
member states’ involvement in the Gulf and spells out further actions together with 
their delivery horizons in order to achieve the four objectives of the regional 
strategy.107  
103 Ibid.; Vircoulon & Tournier, op. cit. 
104 T. Vircoulon & M. Schneider, “West Africa: Where Navies Are Not Enough – Fighting Piracy 
in the Gulf of Guinea”, International Crisis Group, 15 August 2013. 
105 Interview EEAS West Africa, op. cit. 
106 European External Action Service, Gulf of Guinea, op. cit., p. 1. 
107 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the Gulf of Guinea Action Plan 
2015-2020, 7168/15, 16 March 2015, Brussels. 
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The EU’s approach to piracy and armed robbery at sea is clearly focussed 
on supporting the regional dynamic. It aims at creating a common understanding 
among the coastal countries that maritime crime is also detrimental to their own 
long-term economic development, for instance in terms of attracting foreign 
investments. 108 The EU welcomes regional ownership, in this as in other contexts. 
Therefore, the EU tries to mainstream the issue in its dialogues with coastal countries 
and international organisations.109 Some countries, such as Ghana, show eagerness 
to fight maritime crime and to foster regional cooperation in fighting piracy and 
armed robbery at sea because they see great economic potential in their maritime 
domain.110 Maritime security also appears to be a topic that is about to enter the 
agenda of the AU: maritime security in Africa will be discussed during an 
extraordinary summit of the AU in Lomé in 2016.111 
The EU as a financial and technical supporter in the Gulf of Guinea 
What is the EU currently doing, apart from engaging in political dialogues, to fight 
piracy and armed robbery at sea or to support coastal countries in their counter-
piracy efforts in West Africa? The countries around the Gulf in West and Central 
Africa cannot be considered failed states, as is the case for Somalia. This is limiting 
the EU’s room of manoeuvre, for instance, regarding the legal mandate for a military 
intervention in coastal waters. Further, it must be noted that some countries’ political 
elites are allegedly involved in criminal networks or enable their activities.  
In order to enhance regional and national capabilities for the fight against 
maritime crime, the EU focuses on giving advice by deploying experts who help the 
national governments and regional organisations to implement the Yaoundé Code 
of Conduct. Again, with the help of the IcSP-funded CMR programme, the EU is 
supporting the establishment and operation of a regional maritime security 
architecture in the Gulf. The sub-component programme CRIMGO (Critical Maritime 
Routes for the Gulf of Guinea), with a budget of €4.5 million over four years, has 
deployed an expert to the ICC in Yaoundé to enhance maritime security, regional 
cooperation and information sharing and to deliver regional maritime training to the 
stakeholders. An IMO expert is also deployed to Yaoundé, funded by the short-term 
component of the IcSP. For the long term, an additional financial envelope of €7.5 
108 Interview EEAS West Africa, op. cit. 
109 Ibid. 
110 G. Hilse, “Westafrika vereint im Kampf gegen Piraterie”, Deutsche Welle, 18 March 2014. 
111 Togolese Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, TOGO 2015.  
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million within the IcSP is being programmed for 2016 onwards to support maritime 
security with project work in the wider region from Senegal to Angola.112  
These projects’ deliverables, advice and training, can be compared with 
what the EU did under the CSDP framework with its civilian mission EUCAP Nestor in 
East Africa. As the costs for CSDP actions are much higher and Europe is facing an 
economic crisis, the EU’s approach to the Gulf is based on the principle of “low-cost 
but very high-value”.113 The reluctance of the EU to give equipment to coastal 
countries, whose navies and coastguards are poorly equipped, can be interpreted 
in the same vein of avoiding expenses. The EU sees itself as providing expertise rather 
than hardware.114 Somalia is, with Mali, one of the test cases where the EU has tried 
to combine training with the provision of equipment; but the potential of similar 
approaches in West Africa is currently neglected by the EU even though Nigeria 
keeps asking for coastguard assets.115 
Some EU member states provide funding to the Maritime Trade and 
Information Sharing Centre for the Gulf of Guinea (MTISC-GoG) which was an 
initiative of the oil and shipping industry and is supported by the G7++ ‘Friends of the 
Gulf of Guinea’ (G7++FOGG) group, the IMO and INTERPOL. The centre establishes a 
picture of the regional maritime security situation and shares information with the 
shipping companies. 116  However, these companies still lack trust in this facility 
because of possible information leakage about a ship’s position and cargo to the 
pirates. Distrust among private actors also needs to be taken into account as an 
obstacle for the work of the institutions of the Yaoundé process.117 
In order to tackle the root causes of piracy, the EU makes use of its thematic 
and geographical external financing instruments such as the EDF. For instance, an 
indicative amount of €512 million is allocated to Nigeria for the period of 2014-
2020. 118 Nonetheless, these efforts can only be successful and sustainable if the 
political elites are willing to commit to the same objectives. This has not always been 
the case in Nigeria.119 
Comparable to the EUSR for the Horn of Africa, since October 2015, there is 
an EEAS Senior Coordinator for the Gulf of Guinea. Her task is to take overall 
112 Council of the European Union, Gulf of Guinea Action Plan, op. cit., p. 20. 
113 Ibid., p. 15. 
114 Interview EEAS West Africa, op. cit. 
115 Interview EEAS West Africa, op. cit.; Interview EEAS CMPD 1, op. cit. 
116 Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre Gulf of Guinea, “About”, 2014. 
117 Interview ECSA, op. cit. 
118  Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & European Commission, National 
Indicative Programme for the period 2014-2020, Nairobi, 19 June 2014, p. 22f. 
119 Interview EEAS CMPD 2, op. cit. 
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leadership and to coordinate the EU’s and member states’ instruments.120 This new 
position does not have the same status as an EUSR but is on the level of Head of 
Delegation. Financial considerations might have been, again, at the root of the 
decision not to appoint an EUSR. It is yet to be seen to what extent the Senior 
Coordinator will succeed in promoting a coherent, complementary and 
comprehensive EU approach in this fragmented regional context. 
Other potential EU resources inspired by the Horn of Africa 
The EU’s current approach to fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of 
Guinea is different from what it has done in Somalia and around the Horn of Africa. 
The EU diplomats in the EEAS caution against drawing too many parallels between 
the situations in East and West Africa. Some argue that the only lesson learned from 
the East for the West is that there is no lesson learned because the situation of state 
authority is much more advanced in the Gulf countries than in Somalia.121 However, 
a lesson learned on the strategic level is that the EU must not act too late, as 
happened in Somalia, sidelined as it was by the international community during the 
early 2000s.122 
With regard to CSDP instruments, it was argued in the previous sub-section 
that the EU is already copying the regional maritime capacity-building mission 
EUCAP Nestor by using the external financing instrument IcSP and the CRIMGO 
programme in West Africa. Currently, a military solution on the model of EUNAVFOR 
Atalanta for the Gulf of Guinea is clearly off the table, for five reasons: first, it would 
undermine the local ownership of the coastal countries as demonstrated in the 
Yaoundé process. Second, EU member states do not have the necessary naval 
capabilities deployable at the moment (an alleged military weakness that is to be 
questioned in the light of the recent launch of the EUNAVFOR Med operation in the 
Mediterranean Sea in June 2015). Third, there is currently no mandate for such an 
intervention, and the coastal countries are sovereign states that would not accept 
international naval forces fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea in their territorial 
waters. 123  Fourth, some member states fear being accused of neo-colonial 
interference. Fifth, the political elites of some coastal countries such as Nigeria would 
not approve the EU’s military presence because of their collusion with criminal 
networks.124 
120 Council of the European Union, Gulf of Guinea Action Plan, op. cit., p. 19. 
121 Interview EEAS CMPD 1, op. cit. 
122 Interview EEAS West Africa, op. cit. 
123 Interview EEAS CMPD 1, op. cit. 
124 De Gouveia E Melo, conference, European Economic and Social Committee, op. cit. 
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However, European ship-owners see a need for action in the region and 
would welcome an increased military presence of naval forces, even outside the 
territorial waters of coastal countries, to secure maritime transport routes. 125  This 
approach may be supported by the fact that since 2011 more attacks on ships for 
purposes of kidnapping and ransoms have actually taken place in international than 
in territorial waters. 126  But the EU strategists would see the launch of a military 
operation as a step backwards, undermining the established trend in the region for 
maritime security to be accepted as the responsibility of the coastal countries.127  
Nonetheless, one lesson learned in the context of the EU’s military presence 
in the West Indian Ocean might be useful for the Gulf of Guinea: the SHADE 
mechanism helped avoid duplication and enhanced cooperation between 
international naval forces deployed around the Horn of Africa at a purely 
operational and tactical level. Some EU member states such as France, the UK, Spain 
and Portugal, but also NATO and the US, already have warships circulating in the 
Gulf, paying visits to ports in the region on a regular basis or even conducting joint 
exercises with the navies of the coastal countries.128 These activities could be better 
coordinated between the international and local navies in order to make more 
efficient use of military assets with a deterrent effect on pirates.129  
In early 2015, a meeting of AU ministers envisaged the possibility of creating a 
coordination and de-confliction mechanism based on SHADE’s best practice in West 
African waters. The EU could give advice and support the establishment of such a 
mechanism, based on the three essential features of SHADE: it provides a voluntary 
platform for strategic coordination; it avoids politics and focusing on operational 
issues only; and it shows visible success in deterring piracy and armed robbery at sea. 
A potential entry point for the EU and the US to help build and participate in this 
facility could be the African Partnership Station, an already existing cooperation 
programme for maritime security established by US Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF).130 
In this way, the international response and coordination effort to counter 
piracy in the Gulf of Guinea could draw on the lessons learned around the Horn of 
125  L. Marinus, Director of International Relations, Security, Ports and Logistics, European 
Community Shipowners’ Association, conference, “Safe Seas: turning shared maritime 
interests into global security responsibilities”, Brussels, European Economic and Social 
Committee, 24 March 2015. 
126 De Gouveia E Melo, conference, European Economic and Social Committee, op. cit. 
127 Interview EEAS CMPD 1, op. cit. 
128 Interview EEAS West Africa, op. cit.; De Gouveia E Melo, conference, European Economic 
and Social Committee, op. cit. 
129 Interview EEAS West Africa, op. cit. 
130 Interview EEAS CMPD 2, op. cit. 
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Africa, even if the ultimate strategic aims are not the same.131 Similarly, consideration 
may be given to extending the scope of the Somalia-focused CGCPS to include 
piracy phenomena in West Africa, or even worldwide. The success of this new form 
of international governance could be beneficial also for coordinating the 
stakeholders concerned by piracy in the West African waters. Another solution would 
be to expand the membership of the G7++FOGG group, which has already invited 
representatives from the oil and the shipping industries as well as ECOWAS and 
ECCAS to its meetings.132 Whichever mechanism might prove easier to realise, there 
is evidence that cooperation between the different countries and international 
organisations involved in improving maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea needs 
strengthening in order to make effective use of the available resources.133 The EU 
can play a leading role in this regard, drawing on its leadership experience within the 
CGCPS. 
Conclusions 
Owing to its counter-piracy operation, the EU has gained an international reputation 
as the leading maritime security provider in the Horn of Africa. After the launch of its 
first naval CSDP operation in late 2008, the EU added other civilian instruments and 
created a first model case of what a Comprehensive Approach, involving the 
coordinated use of a variety of existing policy instruments, could look like on the 
ground. Nonetheless, the EU’s foreign policy towards the Horn suffered from strategic 
difficulties. Somalia was and still is a thoroughly failed state. As a consequence of the 
central government’s dependence on international help, the EU was able to deploy 
a large variety of instruments, ashore and offshore, military and civilian, short-term or 
long-term oriented. The EU has developed successful tools for military cooperation 
(SHADE) and emerged as an actor in international politico-diplomatic fora (CGCPS). 
The multilateral settings suit the EU well, it has been successful in strengthening them 
because “multilateralism is part of the EU’s DNA”.134 
Although the international response has successfully deterred piracy attacks 
in the last two years, the larger Horn of Africa is unstable, as the ongoing conflict in 
Yemen shows where two factions claim the government. The EU has to update its 
strategic framework and take into account the changing regional dynamics and the 
131 Ibid. 
132 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, G7 Friends of the Gulf of 
Guinea Group, 2015. 
133  A. Gomes, Member of the European Parliament (S&D), speech, Brussels, European 
Parliament, Subcommittee on Security and Defence, 17 March 2015. 
134 Houben, presentation, European Parliament, op. cit. 
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potential resurrection of maritime crime.135 In the long term, it should determine to 
what level piracy and armed robbery at sea are acceptable because military 
presence in the Horn is costly in times of an economic crisis, and other priorities for 
the EU’s military engagement may arise. 
European ship-owners and some policy-makers in Brussels see a shift in piracy 
from the East to the West and float the idea of a stronger EU military presence in the 
Gulf of Guinea in view of EUNAVFOR Atlanta’s success around the Horn of Africa.136 
Following this lead, this paper examined the extent to which the EU can draw on its 
experience made off the Somali coast to deter piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. It 
argued that most member states have little appetite for deploying a second EU 
naval force in African waters. Therefore, the EU aims to foster common threat 
awareness and local ownership among the coastal countries. The EU wants to avoid 
framing piracy and armed robbery as a crisis that might trigger a crisis response. This 
can also be seen as a reluctant approach to securitise this question to the same 
level of attention as in the Somali case. 
Whereas the challenges around the Horn of Africa were rather clear and 
focussed only on Somalia, maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea involves two 
regional organisations and several sovereign national governments, most of them 
democratically elected, but with different interests in the maritime domain. The 
problem, however, seems to be focussed on Nigeria where most incidents occur. In 
Nigeria, the political elites at several governance levels are allegedly interwoven with 
the criminal networks engaged in piracy and armed robbery at sea. Collusion is 
probably the most important and most difficult challenge for external actors in 
addressing the root causes of maritime crime. In the case of Nigerian piracy, the line 
between the criminal and the political dimensions is hard to draw, be it because of 
the (secondary) political objectives of pirates or because of the political elites turning 
a blind eye on piracy because they also benefit from it. Therefore, European ship-
owners inter alia expect the EU to raise diplomatic pressure in order to promote 
effective coastguard protection and the acceptance of private security companies 
on merchant vessels.137 
It was shown in this paper that the EU’s answer to piracy and armed robbery 
at sea off East and West African coasts varies. A thorough analysis of the coastal 
countries’ willingness and capabilities to fight piracy must form the basis of such 
135 Interview EEAS East Africa, op. cit. 
136 Interview with Michael Gahler, Member of the European Parliament (EPP-CD), Brussels, 17 
March 2015. 
137 Marinus, conference, European Economic and Social Committee, op. cit. 
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differentiation. Adapting to the nature of maritime threats, and to the specific 
situation in these coastal countries, is crucial. The lessons that can be learned from 
the Horn of Africa for the EU’s approach to the situation in the Gulf of Guinea are the 
importance of a preventive approach and the value of international cooperation. 
The EU could step up its efforts in the Gulf of Guinea by improving international 
political and military coordination to support instances of growing awareness and 
ownership by some coastal countries to combat maritime threats. This aspect is one 
major element of the EU’s international reputation as a maritime security provider off 
the Somali coast and could play a more important role in the EU’s approach to the 
Gulf of Guinea. 
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